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NOTE
HISTORIC PRESERVATION-AN INDIVIDUAL'S
PERSPECTIVE
INTRODUCTION
Compared with recent efforts to clean up polluted air and
water, rid the countryside of litter, and ensure the protection
of endangered wildlife, efforts to preserve and protect the his-
torical and cultural environment of this country have been slow
to develop. Perhaps this lag can be explained by the private
citizen's lack of awareness of the various alternatives available
to *him regarding historic preservation. If the movement is to
gain momentum and to be successful, it is necessary that all
citizens achieve a greater awareness of the preservation effort.
Such awareness will permit more participation by citizens in
the preservation of our historical culture.
It is the purpose of this work to provide an overview of the
actions taken by federal, state, and local governments to pre-
serve the historic heritage of the United States and to empha-
size the effect of these programs on the individual and private
preservationist groups. The practical application and imple-
mentation of federal and Kentucky laws will be delineated in
Parts I and II of this Note with emphasis on the role of the
private citizen. Part I][ will discuss the use and effect of local
historic zoning ordinances. Finally, the indirect incentives to
private historic preservation contained in federal and Ken-
tucky tax law will be detailed in Part IV.
I. HISTORICAL PRESERVATION ON THE FEDERAL LEVEL
A. Early Legislation
The initial effort of Congress to establish organized histori-
cal preservation was the Antiquities Act of 1906.' This Act
empowered the President "to declare by public proclamation
historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and
' 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-33 (1976). See note 6 infra for the method of federal protection
prior to 1906.
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other objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated
upon the lands owned or controlled by the Government of the
United States to be national monuments."' 2 This legislation has
resulted in the designation of such nationally significant areas
and landmarks as the Grand Canyon,' the Statue of Liberty,
and the Edison Laboratory.' Although serving a useful and
beneficial function for the citizens of the United States,5 the
scope of the Antiquities Act is very narrow.'
Since the statute deals with land owned or controlled by
the federal government, its impact on the proprietary rights of
the individual is negligible. The beneficial consequence of the
act is the existence of a system of "playgrounds" to which
citizens can go to enjoy the relatively unspoiled and- unmarred
scenic and cultural landmarks of this country.
The Historic Sites Act of 19357 "is significant to contempo-
rary preservation law in two respects. It establishes- a national
policy of historical preservation and provides the authority for
the development of an administrative program to identify and
2 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1976).
3 See Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920) (controversy over whether
the Grand Canyon was covered by the Act).
16 U.S.C. § 430 (1976) lists the National and International Monuments and
Memorials that are included in the list of nationally significant landmarks.
3 The areas protected by the Antiquities Act are maintained and operated by the
National Park Service, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1976).
1 The Antiquities Act nominally affects the individual by making it a federal
crime, punishable by fine or imprisonment, to "appropriate, excavate, injure, or de-
stroy" any historic property located on federal property. 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1976). The
National Park Service, which controls the administrative procedures relating to the
system of National Monuments and Memorials, has issued extensive regulations as to
what is permissible and impermissible activity at the parks and monuments under
their jurisdiction. See 36 C.F.R. § 7 (1977) which deals with designated areas.
The importance of the Antiquities Act should not be underestimated:
Prior to 1906, the designation of properties to be afforded federal protection
was carried out by Congress through. . .legislation. Although workable for
a limited program designating outstanding properties, such a system had
obvious limitations. The Antiquities Act broke with this tradition and en-
trusted the executive branch with discretion to determine the significance
of cultural properties . . . . The basic concept of executive branch re-
sponsibility eventually evolved into the sophisticated administrative system
used today for the identification and evaluation of historic properties.
Fowler, Federal Historic Preservation Law: National Historic Preservation Act, Execu-
tive Order 11593, and Other Recent Developments in Federal Law, 12 WAKE FOREST.
L. REv. 31, 34 (1976).
1 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-67 (1976).
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evaluate cultural resources." '8 In its preamble, the Historic
Sites Act states: "It is declared that it is a national policy to
preserve for public use historic sites, buildings and objects of
national significance for the inspiration and benefit of the peo-
ple of the United States."9 This Act established the National
Survey of Historic Sites and Buildings to be administered by
the Secretary of the Interior' in cooperation with the Advisory
Board on National Parks, Historic Sites, Buildings and Monu-
ments." The current list of National Historic Sites contains
such properties as Ford's Theatre, the John F. Kennedy Home,
and the Vanderbilt Mansion. 2 Again, as in the Antiquities Act,
the focus of the Historic Sites Act is on nationally significant
properties and landmarks.
The Historic Sites Act of 1935 did, however, expand the
program for historic preservation of nationally significant prop-
erty. The Act empowers the Secretary of the Interior to
[a]cquire in the name of the United States by gift, purchase,
or otherwise any property, personal or real, . . . or any inter-
est or estate therein. . . .Provided, that no such property
which is owned by any religious or educational institution
* . .shall be so acquired without the consent of the owner
13
The Act also gives the Secretary the power to make contracts
or agreements with the "individuals . . .to protect, preserve,
maintain, or operate any historic or archaeologic building, site,
object, or property . .. regardless as to whether the title
thereto is in the United States."" So, in two new respects,
the private citizen may enter into the coverage of a preserva-
tion act: the private citizen could be directly affected by being
forced to convey land to the United States. Through contract,
the individual could have specific responsibilities with regard
to privately owned property. Like its predecessor, the Antiqui-
ties Act of 1906, the Historic Sites Act's regulations set up
Fowler, supra note 6, at 34.
16 U.S.C. § 461 (1976).
10 16 U.S.C. § 462 (1976).
" 16 U.S.C. § 463 (1976).
22 For a complete list of National Historic Sites, see 16 U.S.C. § 461 (1976).
13 16 U.S.C. § 462(d) (1976).
" 16 U.S.C. § 462(e) (1976).
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provisions for the protection and maintenance of the areas des-
ignated as National Historic Sites,' 5 and also provide for crimi-
nal penalties for violations of such, laws.'6
Without this early legislation, the rapid and explosive in-
dustrial growth of the country in the past seventy-five years
could have resulted in the extermination of many of the natural
and environmental national "wonders" that afford us a great
deal of aesthetic enjoyment today. These attempts by the fed-
eral government to preserve the natural, historic, and cultural
resources of America have produced an extensive and sophisti-
cated system of National Parks for which all people, Americans
or otherwise, should be very grateful.
B. The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966
1. The Scope and Policies
With the enactment of the National Historic Preservation
Act in 1966 (NHPA), 17 the federal government entered a new
realm of cultural and historical, as well as environmental, pro-
tection. Its broad declaration of policy 8 makes it clear that, as
11 36 C.F.R. §§ 1-7 (1977). It should be noted that the regulations contained in
these sections are not specifically designated to pertain to either the Antiquities Act
or the Historic Sites Act, but to all areas under the control and supervision of the
National Park Services through the Department of Interior. See id. § 1.2(h).
1, 36 C.F.R. § 1.3 (1977). The sanctions include fines of not more than $500,
imprisonment for not more than six months, and payment of all costs of the proceed-
ings.
" 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1976).
JA As stated in the Act,
[Tihe spirit and direction of the Nation are founded upon and reflected in
its historic past; . . . the historical and cultural foundations of the Nation
should be preserved as a living part of our community life and development
in order to give a sense of orientation to the American people. ...
16 U.S.C. § 470(a)(b) (1976).
Congress recognized that the federal government should play a larger role in
historic preservation efforts if the policies it had formulated were to be implemented
with success:
[A]Ithough the major burdens of historic preservation have been borne and
major efforts initiated by private agencies and individuals, and both should
continue to play a vital role, it is . . . necessary and appropriate for the
Federal Government to accelerate its historic preservation programs. . . to
give maximum encouragement to agencies and individuals undertaking pres-
ervation by private means, and to assist State and local governments . ..
to expand and accelerate their historic preservation programs and activities.
16 U.S.C. § 470(d) (1976). The study reported that nearly half of the 12,000 buildings
1978-791 1021
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opposed to earlier acts, the program of historic preservation
encompasses properties that are important not only to all
Americans, but also properties significant to their respective
states and communities.'"
The greatest impact on the historic environment of the
United States has been produced by provisions of NHPA estab-
lishing responsibilities of the federal agencies with respect to
the governmental programs for historic preservation 20 and pro-
visions authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to establish a
comprehensive grants-in-aid program in order to assist state
historic preservation efforts.2
recorded under the auspices of the National Historic Sites Act of 1935 had been de-
stroyed in some manner since the passage of the Act. See Fowler, supra note 6, at 39
n.29. See also legislative history of NHPA: H.R. REP. No. 1916, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
2, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 3307-11.
" Despite the Congressional zeal expressed in its preamble, the NHPA languished
for some time after its enactment. In 1971, then President Nixon issued Executive
Order 11,593, entitled "Protections and Enhancement of the Cultural Environment,"
directed at the federal agencies and the Secretary of the Interior. Exec. Order No.
11,593, 36 Fed. Reg. 8921 (1971), reprinted in 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1976). This Executive
Order was, no doubt, an attempt to prod the bureaucratic behemoth into some sort of
concrete action with regard to the programs and policies of the Act. Part of the problem
was funding, although not really from a lack of it, but more from a lack of what to do
with it. See S. REP. No. 781, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS )988, 2989.
The absence of clear and definite guidelines to the proper procedures to be fol-
lowed by the agencies (as well as by the states) was probably a substantial factor in
the initial ineffectiveness of the Act. The Advisory Council did not establish their
procedures for compliance with the NHPA until February 28, 1973; see 38 Fed. Reg.
5388 (1973). Amendments were added in 1974 after consultation with the various
federal agencies. See 41 Fed. Reg. 5910 (1976).
20 16 U.S.C. § 470(f) (1976).
There is another significant section of NHPA, 16 U.S.C. § 470(n) (1976), which
authorizes the participation of the United States in the International Centre for Study
of Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (Rome Centre). "The Centre is
an independent, intergovernmental organization which was established by UNESCO."
Its activities are to "collect, develop, and disseminate technical information relating
to the preservation of culturally and historically important objects" and to conduct
educational programs. [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2991. "There is wide-
spread agreement that an essential step in the timely solution of this problem
[historical preservation] is to join with conservators of other nations in cooperative
programs of training and research ... " Id. at 2997.
21 16 U.S.C. § 470(a)(2) (1976). See text accompanying notes 37-57 infra for a
discussion of the grant-in-aid program. Also significant is the creation of the National
Register of Historic Places. See text accompanying note 49 infra for a discussion of the
importance of the National Register.
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2. NHPA and Government Agencies
Section 470f of the National Historic Preservation Act pro-
vides that federal agencies must file reports with the Advisory
Council22 concerning possible effects on historically significant
properties within a proposed project's bounds so that the coun-
cil may evaluate those repercussions.2s
The Council and the agency consult with each other and
evaluate the feasibility of completing the project as proposed. 24
16 U.S.C. § 470(f) (1976). To oversee the proper implementation of and compli-
ance with the provisions of the Act, the NHPA established the Advisory Council on
Historic Preservation composed of twenty-nine members, seventeen of whom are either
agency officials or cabinet members, and twelve of whom are from outside the federal
government and appointed by the President. 16 U.S.C. § 470(i) (1976). The primary
functions of the Advisory Council are to "advise the President and the Congress in
matters relating to historic preservation; recommend measures to coordinate activities
of Federal, State and local agencies and private institutions and individuals relating
to historic preservation, and advise on the dissemination of information pertaining to
such activities." 16 U.S.C. § 470(j) (1976).
2 Various interpretive problems with the Act arose and had to be settled in the
courts. One of the questions NHPA presented involved the meaning of "federally
funded." See Edwards v. First Bank of Dundee, 534 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir. 1976); O'Brien
v. Brinegar, 379 F. Supp. 289, 290 (D. Minn. 1970) (a project is federally funded for
NHPA purposes if it is "wholly or partially funded with federal money").
The application of NHPA to states was an issue. See Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130
(4th Cir. 1971) (NHPA imposes no duties on the states and operates only upon federal
agencies).
The issue arose as to whether compliance by the agency was required when prop-
erty was listed on the National Register after appropriations for the project had been
made. See Kent County Council for Historic Preservation v. Romney, 304 F. Supp. 885
(W.D. Mich. 1969) (Council comment not required after payments made to state). See
also South Hill Neighborhood Ass'n v. Romney, 421 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1969), and Hart
v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 551 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1977). Another question was
whether compliance by the agency was required after substantial or partial completion
of the project; see Save the Courthouse Comm. v. Lynn, 408 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (Property listed on National Register in January of 1975 did not require the
Department of Housing and Urban Development to submit reports to the Advisory
Council since project was nearly completed. However, an injunction was granted to
halt demolition of property based on a provision in Executive Order 11,593 which
imposed the duty on federal agencies of adopting internal procedures for historical
preservation, and on HUD's constructive incorporation of the Advisory Council's regu-
lations.) These issues were settled in 1976 when the text of 16 U.S.C. § 470(f) was
amended to include property "eligible for inclusion in" the National Register. [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2442.
24 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(a) (2) (1977). The agency official and the State Historic Preser-
vation Officer are to evaluate whether "the undertaking causes or may cause any
change, beneficial or adverse, in the quality of the historical, architectural, archeologi-
cal, or cultural character that qualifies the property under the National Register cri-
teria." Id. § 800.8. For the criteria regarding what constitutes adverse effect, see id. §
1978-79] 1023
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Various information-gathering techniques are used, such as on-
site inspection or open public meetings. Such meetings allow
private citizens and interest groups to make a valuable contri-
bution in this decision-making process. 5 Even if the Council
decides against the project, the Council's comments are in no
way binding on the agency official. The Council is, as its name
implies, advisory. If the Council determines that the project as
it is planned would have an adverse effect on the properties
involved, the agency official may decide to proceed with the
original project.
21
Although the NHPA has more far-reaching ramifications
to the individual in conjunction with the grants-in-aid pro-
gram, the role of the individual land owner or concerned citizen
does have some significance under Section 470f. 27 As one com-
mentator noted, the NHPA "relies for its effectiveness on the
800.9. Bascially, neglect includes destruction, alteration, isolation, the introduction of
elements out of character with the setting, and neglect. Id.
See 36 C.F.R. § 800.5(c) (1977).
26 Under the regulations, however, the agency officer will be required to file subse-
quent reports to the Council as to the ultimate effect of the project on the property
involved. 36 C.F.R. § 800.6(j) (1977).
Although, theoretically, the agency official is the final arbiter of the project's
status, his initial decisions as to the importance of the area affected may be subject to
scrutiny. A particularly dramatic example of this type of situation arose in Stop H-3
Ass'n v. Coleman, 533 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1976), which involved the construction of a
federally funded highway through Moanalu Valley, a scenic and historically significant
area on the island of Oahu (see id. at 436 n.1). The Secretary of Transportation, after
receiving comments from the Hawaii Historic Places Review Board that the valley was
of "marginal" local significance decided to go ahead with the highway construction.
When plaintiff intervened, asking the court for an injunction to halt construction until
the Transportation Secretary had conformed to the procedural requirements of NHPA,
the district court entered, but then dissolved, the injunction. Plaintiffs appealed and
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court, recognizing the necessity
for the Secretary of the Interior to have the power to determine, independently of state
or agency action, the significance of a particular property. The Court of Appeals stated:
If it should be held that the Interior Secretary has no power to determine
that properties have state or local historic significance, there would, in our
view, be a virtual nullification of NHPA . . . .Whenever a city or state
preferred a federally funded [project] to an historic site, the local body
could simply declare the site insignificant.
Id. at 441 n.13.
" See Save the Courthouse Comm. v. Lynn, 408 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Kent County Council for Historic Preservation v. Romney, 304 F. Supp. 885 (W.D.
Mich. 1969); South Hill Neighborhood Ass'n v. Romney, 421 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1969)
for examples of citizen involvement.
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conscientiousness and awareness of the federal agency."' '
Much of the litigation arising under the Act is based on the
theory that the federal agency involved had failed or neglected
to comply with the provisions of Section 470f.2 1 A survey of the
case law indicates that private organizations have formed in
order to insure that the policies and procedures of the NHPA
are implemented properly. Thus if a federal agency embarks
upon a project in which historical sites are threatened without
taking the necessary steps to preserve the area or without con-
sidering the effect of the project on the area involved, the pri-
vate citizen (or citizens as a group) may then bring suit to
enjoin the agency from continuing with the project until it has
complied with the appropriate procedures. This situation does,
of course, raise the problem of the individual's "standing" to
sue as a person "injured" or "adversely affected" by the agency
action or omission.
3 0
The criteria by which standing is defined has a very check-
ered and diverse past, especially in cases categorized as
"environmental" in nature.31 One of the earliest cases to be
brought to the courts under NHPA was South Hill Neighbor-
hood Association v. Romney.3 2 The court inferred that because
the plaintiffs did not own or legally control the buildings in
question, they had no personal interest in the litigation.3 3 This
2 Comment, National Historic Preservation Policy: A Review, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 119,
123 (1975).
" See, e.g., Save the Courthouse v. Lynn, 408 F. Supp. 1323, 1327 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). A particularly gross example of agency contravention of NHPA occurred in
Don't Tear It Down, Inc. v. Gen. Serv. Adm'n, 401 F. Supp. 1194 (D.D.C. 1975). After
having agreed to halt demolition of the property in question until after submission of
the matter to a full Advisory Council meeting to be held in May, 1974, the GSA
officials decided to go ahead and demolish the buildings on March 3, 1974. Since the
comments of the Advisory Council are not binding on the agency (see accompanying
note 26 supra) and the agency is the final determinor of the continuance of the project,
the GSA reasoned that even if the Council comments were negative, they would, as is
their right, continue with the project as originally planned. This case demonstrates one
of the major problems with the Act's procedures. For a critical analysis, see Comment,
supra note 28.
See The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
' This work does not encompass a complete discussion of the standing issue and
the problems involved. An excellent treatment is contained in Vardaman, Standing
to Sue in Historic Preservation Cases, 36 LAw & CoN'rMP. PROB. 406 (1971). This
subject is also treated in Comment, Historic Preservation Cases: A Collection, 12 WAKE
FoREST L. REv. 227 (1976).
- 421 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1025 (1970).
" Id. at 460-61. See also Vardaman, supra note 31, at 412.
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view that the party involved must have an economic or proprie-
tary interest in the litigation has for the most part been re-
jected in the cases involving an environmental "injury" to the
parties.
Recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court
have applied a more acceptable and lenient standing criteria.34
The more lenient standing requirement reflects the general pol-
icies of the National Historic Preservation Act that the private
individual "should continue to play a vital role"35 in the efforts
to preserve our national heritage. "It is appropriate that con-
comitantly with the enactment of these statutes and the grow-
ing public and private concern with the protection of the envi-
ronment, the courts have liberalized the doctrine of standing
so that it no longer looms as a major obstacle to environmental
and conservation litigation.""6
The individual's involvement in the program for historical
preservation which the federal government has authorized re-
tains a great deal of vitality. The private citizen, or a group of
citizens, need not sit idly by while a federal agency plans pro-
jects which threaten that citizen's historical and cultural envi-
ronment with destruction.
3. The Federal Grants-In-Aid Program: A Major Step In a
More Cohesive Historical Preservation Program
The most important aspect of NHPA, in terms of fostering
a more comprehensive historical preservation effort, is the cre-
ation of a matching grants-in-aid program to be administered
by the Department of the Interior in conjunction with the State
31 A two-prong standard was proposed in Data Processing Service Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). First, the action by the agency must have caused
the plaintiff injury in fact. The injury is not limited to economic harm but may
encompass aesthetic, conservational, or recreational interests. Secondly, the interest
that the plaintiff wishes to protect must be within the zone of interest that the statute
regulates. See Comment, Historic Preservation Cases: A Collection, 12 WAKE FoREST
L. REv. 227 (1976). See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972), where
this concept was refined. It has been judically determined that "an organization whose
members are injured may represent those members in a proceeding for judicial re-
view." Id. at 739. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1962). For application
of this standing issue in the context of historic preservation, see River v. Richmond
Metropolitan Auth., 359 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Va. 1973).
35' 16 U.S.C. § 470(d) (1976).
36 Vardaman, supra note 31, at 415.
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Historic Preservation Program."7 The states are encouraged to
participate in the federal efforts for historic preservation; states
can receive federal funds for acquisition, protection, rehabilita-
tion, restoration, and reconstruction of properties included in
the National Register."
The basic requirements for state participation in the
grants program are: (1) a comprehensive statewide plan and
survey of historic preservation, approved by the Secretary of
the Interior; (2) compliance with regulations and procedures
set forth by the Department of the Interior; (3) assumption of
total costs of maintenance of the property after completion of
the work for which the funding was granted; and (4) appropria-
tion by the state of at least one-half of the preservation pro-
ject's cost.39 Other administrative requirements have also been
set forth by NHPA10
The most important requirement necessary to qualify a
state for participation is the comprehensive statewide plan of
preservation.4' The regulations published by the Interior42 pro-
vide the states with the relevant guidelines as to exactly how
they are to set up their respective plans, and what information
they will be required to furnish the Secretary of the Interior in
order to satisfy those requirements. The state historic preserva-
tion plan is, in general, "a series of reports on the state historic
' 16 U.S.C. § 470(a)(2) (1976). Part of the legislative history of NHPA sets forth
the rationale of this program. Principally, the grant system is used because of the
limited knowledge of the "need for assistance in preserving properties of local, State,
and regional significance." H.R. REP. No. 1916, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in
[1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 3307, 3309.
-A 36 C.F.R. § 60.3 (1977). These terms are defined specifically by the Department
of the Interior in materials furnished to each state.
Actually, there are two grant-in-aid programs on the federal level. One allows
funds for grants to states for the purpose of preservation of historic property. The
second program authorizes grants to states for use in establishing a state plan. See the
report cited in note 37, supra.
11 16 U.S.C. § 470(b) (1976). This section was amended in 1976 to authorize the
Secretary of the Interior to increase the federal portion of a specific grant to 70% of
the costs of a single project as long as the total funds apportioned to the state historic
preservation did not exceed 50% of the state's total allocation. See 16 U.S.C. §
470(b)(c) (1976).
,O See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 470(d) (1976), which prohibits grants to surveys or projects
receiving assistance from other federal programs; 16 U.S.C. § 470(e) (1976), which
requires record keeping by recipients of assistance.
"1 42 Fed. Reg. 47,658-59 (1977).
12 See 36 C.F.R. § 60,800 (1977), 42 Fed. Reg. 47,658 (1978).
1978-79] 1027
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preservation program. These reports . . . shall describe, ana-
lyze, and make future projections about the program. 4 3 The
plan is to include the following information: "an explanation
of the philosophy or rationale behind the program component,
a report on current status, an evaluation of effectiveness, and
a projection of future plans."" The regulations outline the res-
ponsibilities of the State Historic Preservation Officer, the pro-
cess for a statewide survey,45 and the establishment of a state
professional staff4" and a State Review Board . 7 The state plan
should set out these necessary offices and officers along with
their requisite administrative and operational functions." Spe-
cifics of each state's plan are generally left to the discretion of
the state preservation officer.
When a state has established an approved preservation
plan and property within that state is listed on the National
Register, individuals within that state can then seek a federal
grant for a preservation project. The individual owner of Ken-
tucky property must follow state as well as federal procedures.
The federal matching grants are used exclusively for the preser-
vation of property listed on the National Register.49
Nomination of a property to the National Register may be
made by the federal government (in any of its various capaci-
ties), a state, or a private group or citizen (through the state
plan) ° The state has the authorization to nominate
"properties of State and local significance, regardless of loca-
tions within the State and whether publicly or privately
" 42 Fed. Reg. 47,660 § 61.7 (1977).
" Id.
S Id. at 47,658-59 §§ 61.2, .6 (1978).
" Id. at 47,659 § 61.3. The staff consists of full-time professionals in history,
archeology, and architectural history or architecture.
"7 Id. § 61.4.
"1 Id. at 47,658 § 61.2(b) (1978). The federal regulations also indicate the responsi-
bilities of the State Historic Preservation Officer. Id.
" "The National Register is an authoritative guide to be used by Federal, State
and local governments, private groups, and citizens to identify the Nation's cultural
resources and to indicate what properties should be considered for protection from
destruction or impairment." 36 C.F.R. § 60.2 (1977). For a current list of those proper-
ties listed in the National Register, see 43 Fed. Reg. 5,163 (1978).
36 C.F.R. § 60.2 (1977). All nominations initiated by individuals or private
organizations must be received by and administered through the state's historic preser-
vation offices.
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owned ' 5' and federally owned property as well.52 The state
should follow the "Criteria for Evaluation" in considering
whether a specific property is appropriate for nomination."
Things to be considered include the quality or significance in
American history, architecture, archeology and culture, the
property's association with historic events or persons, and the
artistic contributions or distinctiveness that the property em-
bodies.54 Once a property is deemed worthy of nomination, the
state must provide notice to the property owners.55
The nomination forms submitted by the state are reviewed
by the federal Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation.5"
If the nomination is "found to be technically and professionally
sufficient and in conformance with the National Register cri-
teria for evaluation [it] will be approved . . . and entered in
the National Register."57
The Kentucky program functions as a separate but inter-
woven part of the national preservation effort. The preserva-
tion program in Kentucky will therefore be analyzed with em-
phasis on grant-in-aid procedures and the relationship between
the state and federal programs.
II. THE KENTUCKY HISTORIC PRESERVATION EFFORTS
A. The Kentucky Heritage Commission
Legislation to preserve the historical heritage of the state
of Kentucky was enacted in 196611 with the creation of the
Kentucky Heritage Commission (KHC). 9 Unlike the Kentucky
51 Id.
52 Id. § 60.11 (1977).
0 One of the problems addressed in these regulations was the respective roles of
the federal agency, the state, and the private sector. As the regulations point out, when
the federal agency is in the process of determining the eligibility of a specific site, the
opinion of the State Historic Preservation Officer is advisory, and only the Secretary
of Interior has the authority to make a definitive ruling. 42 Fed. Reg. 47,663 (1977).
, 36 C.F.R. § 60.6 (1977).
" Id. § 60.12 (1977).
" Id. § 60.15 (7) (1977).
Id. § 60.15(8) (1977). See also id. § 60.12(c) (1977), which states that, while
identification and nomination for the National Register is a state function, the Na-
tional Park Service usually accepts the state proposals.
-" 1966 Ky. Acts, ch. 87 § 3.
51 Ky. REv. STAT. § 171.381 (Supp. 1976) (hereinafter cited as KRS). This statute,
which has language very similar to that of the NHPA, was approved approximately
six months prior to the enactment of the federal law.
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Historical Society,60 the Commission operates as a separate
administrative body of the state government and consequently
is authorized td act within the bounds of its stated authority.
6'
In 1972, the Commission was designated as the appropriate
agency to implement the policies and procedures of NHPA in
Kentucky.2
B. Procedures for Obtaining a Matching Grant-in-Aid in
Kentucky
To illustrate exactly how an individual or private group
63
in Kentucky must proceed to secure a federal matching grant,
assume that the Township Kentucky Historic Society is the
owner of a somewhat dilapidated, but structurally sound house
which is listed on the National Register. There is documented
evidence (deeds, letters, etc.) that the house was once owned
and lived in by the founder of Township, who later went on to
become prominent in state politics. There is also some evidence
that other prominent Kentucky figures were frequent guests in
the house and that some of the original furnishings and house-
hold effects (which are still owned by the Society) were gifts
from these guests.
The Kentucky Heritage Commission sends out grant-in-
aid pre-application forms each year to the owners or adminis-
trators of those properties listed in the Register. So, in the
The Kentucky Historical Society was created in 1880 and is organized as a
corporation with a state granted charter. The Society functions as an information
gathering organization with emphasis on the "advancement and dissemination of
knowledge of the history of Kentucky." See KRS § 171.311 (Supp. 1976).
6, The Kentucky Heritage Commission is authorized to, among other things, re-
view projects to insure preservation, accept grants, enter into contracts, acquire prop-
erty, and initiate its own projects for historic preservation. See KRS § 171.381 (Supp.
1976).
11 Executive Order 72-869, September 18, 1972. A statewide survey and plan was
developed by the Commission and has been approved by the Department of the Inte-
rior. 42 Fed. Reg. 47,660 § 61.7 (1977).
The most recent Status Report issued by the Kentucky Heritage Commission,
covering the period of July 1, 1977-June 30, 1978, stated: "[T]he major program
goals of the Kentucky Heritage Commission are successfully being accomplished."
KENTUCKY HERITAGE COMMISSION, PROGRAM STATUS REPORT 108 (July 1, 1977-June 30,
1978).
13 This designation includes private organizations, local historic commissions, and
cities or towns. Letter from the Kentucky Heritage Commission to Applicants for
Preservation Funds (March, 1978).
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hypothetical situation, the Society will at some point, early in
the fiscal year, receive grant-in-aid pre-application forms from
the Commission. The Society will have until the following July
1 to complete these forms and return them to the Commission
if it decides to seek a grant.64 The Township Kentucky Historic
Society would like to restore and preserve the building and has
been able to raise some money for the partial restoration of the
property but not enough to complete the process. The Society
decides that the only way the project can be completed is to
get help from the government. The Society completes the forms
and returns them to the Commission.
The KHC evaluates the Township project, considering
such factors as the historical significance of the property, the
community support, and the capability of the applicant to
match the federal grant. The KHC reviews the Township
forms and considers the project important enough to include it
in its annual request for allocation of grant funds. The United
States Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation will in
turn review the State's request and appropriate the funds ac-
cordingly.6
If the Office of Archeology approves the request, the Town-
ship Kentucky Historic Society must then "submit plans and
specification of professional quality for all proposed work to the
Kentucky Heritage Commission." 7 The review process by the
Commission is renewed and, if approved, it is again forwarded
to the Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation for its
ultimate approval.
8
If the Office of Archeology approves the project and the
amount of funds to be allocated, the recipient is then eligible
actually to receive the funds from the grants program. How-
,, See KENTUCKY HERITAGE COMMISSION, PRESERVATION GRANTs MANuAL 1 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as PRESERVATION GRANTS MANUAL].
" Id.
" If Congress appropriates the full 60 Million dollars for the National
Historic Preservation fund in FY 79, it is anticipated that Kentucky will
receive $1.2 million as her share. Yet, it is clear that even the new funding
level will be inadequate to meet the need for restoration projects in Kentucky
which is in excess of $9 million.
KENTUCKY HERITAGE COMMISSION, PROGRAM STATUS REPORT 108 (July 1, 1977-June 30,
1978).
" PRESERVATION GRANTs MANUAL at 1.
"Id.
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ever, even if the Township Project is not approved on the fed-
eral level, there may be an additional source of funds for this
Kentucky preservation effort. The Kentucky Heritage Com-
mission has developed its own State Grants-In-Aid Program,
which operates independently of and in conjunction with the
federal program. In addition, the state may provide part of the
matching funds normally provided by an individual or group
when the federal program provides the other half of the funds. 9
Regardless of whether the resources come from federal or
Kentucky grants,70 the recipient of the grant must administer
the project in accordance with the applicable state and federal
regulations. These administrative requirements revolve pri-
marily around the proper documentation and recordation of
the expenses incurred by the project administrator in the
course of the work on the historic property. Progress reports are
also required.
7
1
As a result of receiving these matching funds, the recipient
has certain obligations with respect to the property, contingent
upon acceptance of the grant. The recipient's primary obliga-
tion is to insure proper maintenance of the property once the
preservation project is completed:
When grant assistance is transferred to a private organization
or individual for the restoration of historic property, the
transferee shall encumber the title to the property with a
covenant running with the land, in favor of and enforceable
by the state, providing that the owners and their successors
in interest, if any, shall repair, maintain, and administer the
premises so as to preserve the historical integrity of the fea-
tures, materials, appearance, workmanship, and environ-
ment.
72
" See KENTUCKY HERITAGE COMMISSION, GRANT-IN-Am HISTORIC PRESERVATION
PouciEs AND PROCEDURES.
10 The State Program is essentially patterned after the federal program in terms
of project administration, deed covenants for post-project administration, and public
benefit policies.
1, For a detailed description of these requirements, see the PRESERVATION GRANTS
MANUAL. The recipient must be very careful to insure that these procedures are cor-
rectly and sufficiently followed because the grant money is received as reimbursement
for money actually spent, not as an advance lump sum payment of 50% of the prospec-
tive expenses. If, however, the project expenses are large enough, the administrator
may request periodic reimbursement during the period that the actual work is being
done. PRESERVATION GRANTS MANUAL at 2.
2 Id. at 15.
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The length of time for which this restrictive covenant runs is
dependent upon the amount of money received by the owner
from the federal program.
3
Since one of the goals of the grant program is to enhance
the cultural and historic environment of the general public, the
recipient of such funds must comply with designated "public
benefits" policies. 4 This requirement may include providing
access to the historically significant property to the public for
at least twelve days a year.7"
The benefits received by a recipient of a federal or state
grant (not to mention the societal benefits) is dispropor-
tionately great when compared to the rather minimal obliga-
tions demanded by the government as prerequisites for partici-
pating in the grants program. It seems that the developers of
the program have attempted to simplify the bureaucratic pro-
cess by which the grants are obtained as much as possible while
not foresaking the necessary safeguards for control that such a
program of this size and nature demand.
]II. LOCAL PRESERVATION EFFORTS
A. Municipal Zoning Laws
In an examination of the effect of historic preservation
laws on owners of historic or architecturally significant struc-
tures, it is important to consider the impact of local legislative
efforts, which may take the form of direct regulation of historic
property through the use of zoning ordinances. Zoning provides
a municipal body with a flexible tool to assist in preventing
undesirable development or change within an historical area
and may also serve to require or encourage uses compatible
with an historic setting. For that reason historic preservation
n The length of the covenant is based on the following levels of assistance:
1. Federal assistance from $0 to $5,000: Letter of Agreement Only/No Cove-
nant.
2. Federal assistance from $5,001 to $20,000: 5 year covenant.
3. Federal assistance from $20,001 to $50,000: 10 year covenant.
4. Federal assistance from $50,001 to $100,000: 15 year covenant.
5. Federal assistance over $100,000: 20 year covenant.
Letter from Kentucky Heritage Commission to Grant Recipients (July 24, 1978).
7' PRESERVATION GRANTS MANUAL at 15.
11 Id. at 15-16. This includes access to the interior of structures for which funding
was allocated.
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ordinances have become an integral part of many communities'
comprehensive plans to preserve their historical, cultural, and
natural environment. Seven cities in Kentucky have enacted
such ordinances.
7 6
The Kentucky ordinances are enacted pursuant to an ena-
bling statute which allows zoning to be employed to "facilitate
. . . the visual or historical character of the [planning]
unit." The ordinances vary in form and degree of regulation,
the most frequently occurring type being what is commonly
referred to as an "historic district ordinance. ' 78 Typically, the
ordinance establishes an architectural review board .7  The
board is empowered to inspect and designate area structures
and premises that it considers to have substantial historic or
architectural merit, and to make recommendations regarding
the establishment of historic districts." The procedure for es-
tablishment' is initiated either by the board, the planning
commission, the local legislative body, or an individual owner
of potentially subject property. 2 The procedures call for a se-
76 COVINGTON, KY., COMM'R ORDINANCE No. 50 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
COVINGTON]; FRANKFORT, Ky., ZONING CODE art. 27 [hereinafter cited as FRANKFORT];
LEXINGTON, Ky., ZONING CODE art. 11 [hereinafter cited as LEXINGTON]; LOUISVILLE,
Ky., ORDINANCE 58 (1973) [hereinafter cited as LouisVLE]; MAYSVILLE, Ky., ZONING
ORDINANCE art. XIII (March 1974) [hereinafter cited as MAVSviLLE]; PADUCAH, KY.,
ZONING CODE § 62 [hereinafter cited as PADUCAH]; PARis, Ky., art. M § 3.27 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as PAris].
n KRS § 100.201 (1971). The statute specifically authorizes the creation of historic
districts, id. § 100.203(i)(e) (Supp. 1978) and allows for the establishment of an admin-
istrative board to advise the zoning administrator regarding the issuance of "permits"
in such districts, id. § 100.127(3). The board is to be guided by the standards and
restrictions of the community's comprehensive plan and by the historic district regula-
tions adopted by the planning unit. Id.
18 Frankfort, Lexington, Maysville, Paducah, and Paris have historic district ordi-
nances.
11 For the structure and composition of the board, see FRANKFORT, supra note 76,
at §§ 27.91-.911; LEXINGTON, supra note 76, at § 11.3; MAysvsw , supra note 76, at §
13.5; PADUCAH, supra note 76, at §§ 62.01-.02; PARis, supra note 76, at § 3.273.
" See e.g., LEXINGTON, supra note 76, at § 11.32; MAYsvIL, supra note 76, at §
13.52; PARIS, supra note 76, at § 3.2732.
1 See LEXINGTON, supra note 76, at § 11.4; MAYSviLLE, supra note 76, at § 13.6;
PARIs, supra note 76, at § 3.274. Frankfort and Paducah have not combined establish-
ment procedures within their historic district ordinances. Presumably the procedure
would be that normally employed in the establishment of restrictive zones.
12 This act is done by the filing of an application for designation with the architec-
tural review board. If a governmental body submits the application, the owner is
required to be promptly notified by registered mail. LEXINGTON, supra note 76, at §
11.41; MAYSviLLE, supra note 76, at § 13.61; PARis, supra note 76, at § 3.2741.
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ries of public hearings and recommendations by both the board
and the planning commission. The recommendations are acted
upon by the local legislative body which has the power to desig-
nate an area as an historic district.
The historic district classification normally acts as an
"overlay zone" in that the regulations thereunder are imposed
in addition to those under the zone classification otherwise in
effect for the subject area. 3 All structures within an area zoned
as an historic district become subject to the regulations under
the ordinance regardless of their historic or architectural signif-
icance. The regulations operate to prohibit the building inspec-
tor from issuing permits for the destruction, construction, al-
teration, moving, or change in external appearance of any
structure within an historic district unless a "certificate of ap-
propriateness" has been issued. 4 In order to obtain a certifi-
cate, an owner must file an application with the architectural
review board. In reviewing the application, the board is re-
quired to consider certain criteria and standards as set forth in
the ordinance.15 If the board approves the application, the cer-
tificate is issued by the planning commission and, presuming
all other legal requirements are met, the owner is allowed to
proceed. If the board disapproves the application the owner
may appeal to the planning commission. If, after holding a
10 See LEXINGTON, supra note 76, at § 11.2; PARIS, supra note 76, at 3.217. Frank-
fort, Maysville, and Paducah do not use the overlay zone concept but rather limit the
uses in historic districts. For example, in Maysville the only uses permitted in an
historic zone are those uses allowed in residential zones; uses for governmental, profes-
sional, insurance, real estate, and other similar office purposes; uses for banks and
savings and loan offices (excluding drive-in facilities); and uses for retail businesses
having a substantial relationship to matters of historic interest, e.g., gift, antique,
book, art, handicraft, and other similar businesses. MAYSVIIIE, supra note 76, at § 27.2.
I" See FRANKFORT, supra note 76, at §§ 27.81, .9; LEXINGTON, supra note 76, at §
11.5; MAysVLLE, supra note 76, at § 13.7; PADucAH, supra note 76, at § 62.01; PARIS,
supra note 76, at § 3.275.
See, e.g., LEXINGTON, supra note 76, at § 11.51:
[Tihe Board. . . shall examine the architectural design and the exte-
rior surface, treatment of the structures on the site in question, and their
relationship to other structures within the area, and other pertinent factors
affecting the appearance and efficient functioning of the Historic District.
The Board shall not consider any interior arrangements nor shall it make
requirements except for the purpose of preventing developments obviously
incongruous to the historic aspects of the district.
See also FRANKFORT, supra note 76, at § 27.82; MAYSVILLE, supra note 76, at § 13.71;
PARIS, supra note 76, at § 3.2751;" PADucAH, suprh note 76, at § 62.01.
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public hearing, the commission also disapproves, a stay period
is imposed during which time the board and the commission
may negotiate a compromise with the owner. 6 If such a com-
promise is not reached by the expiration of the stay period,
most ordinances permit the owner to proceed with the proposed
project, although some may permanently deny the permit."
There exists a second form of historic preservation ordi-
nance which typically extends protective regulation to individ-
ual landmarks or landmark sites. Such "landmark commission
ordinances" have been adopted in two cities in Kentucky. s' The
ordinances establish a "landmark commission" whose powers
and duties generally exceed those of an architectural review
board. 9 However, the administrative bodies perform basically
the same function as an architectural review board with regard
to proposed changes in designated structures or areas." The
Although the procedures for approval or disapproval of the proposed project are
similar among the historic district ordinances in Kentucky, the protection afforded to
the property varies significantly. FRANKFORT, supra note 76, at §§ 27.89, .9 (for any
construction, alteration, moving, or change in exterior appearance, a stay period is
imposed until a compromise is reached); LEXINGTON, supra note 76, at § 11.5 (six
month stay period for all permits); MAYSViLLE, supra note 76, at § 13.712 (two year stay
period for all permits); PADucAH, supra note 76, at § 62.01 (building permits and
permits to "raze, wreck, or remove" can be permanently denied unless found to be in
harmony with the preservation of the historic zone); PArs, supra note 76, at § 3.2753
(3 month stay period for all permits).
" See note 86 supra.
U See COVINGTON, supra note 76; LouliLvLE, supra note 76.
" For example, the Louisville ordinance gives the commission (Historic Land-
marks and PreserVation Districts Commission) the power to receive, hold, and spend
funds, LouisvLL, supra note 76, § 2f, and to adopt all regulations necessary to carry
out its functions, id. § 2g. The commission has the power to designate historical areas
and sites (subject to approval of the board of aldermen). Id. § 4. In addition, the
commission is empowered to perform such complementary activities as conducting
area surveys, establishing a marker identification system, and disseminating informa-
tion to the public. Id. § 3. Such powers are not typically extended to an architectural
review board.
The Louisville ordinance is somewhat unique in providing for a second administra-
tive body to be created for each area or site designated under the ordinance. This body
serves as intermediary between the property owner and the commission. A person
desiring to alter a designated structure must first apply to this body for a "certificate
of no external effect." If the body denies such a certificate, then the owner must apply
for a certificate of appropriateness. It is then the function of the body to make recom-
mendations on the application to the commission. LouisvILLE, supra note 76, §§ 4(c),
7-8.
H See LouIsviLLE, supra note 76, §§ 6-8; COVINGTON, supra note 76, § 40.07-.10.
One noticeable difference is the finality of the commissions' decisions. See LousvLE,
supra note 76, § 8 (no administrative appeal provided for); COVINGTON, supra note 76,
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protective regulations, like those under historic district ordi-
nances, entail the imposition of a stay period upon refusal by
the landmark commission to grant a certificate of appropriate-
ness. " One ordinance includes a permanent bar against demo-
lition.2 In addition, the ordinances impose an affirmative
maintenance duty on owners of designated property, the viola-
tion of which could lead to the imposition of criminal penal-
ties.1
3
B. Other Preservation Techniques
In addition to the imposition of land use restrictions, a
municipality may also rely on its power of eminent domain to
provide for the protection or preservation of historic property. 4
Such power may be used either as an alternative or a supple-
ment to historic district and landmark ordinances. For exam-
ple, if a structure is protected under an ordinance only for a
temporary period, at the expiration of the period a city may
condemn the threatened property. Similarly, if protection is
afforded only to structures within historic districts, the power
of eminent domain may be used to protect individual landmark
or landmark sites that are outside of the district.
However, the acquisition of a fee interest in such property
§ 40.12 (administrative or judicial appeal provided for but only where alleged error
committed by commission).
Another difference exists with respect to the designation of areas or sites. See
COVINGTON, supra note 76, § 40.08 (commission conducts survey, classifies structures
as "exceptional," "excellent" or "notable" and submits list from which the board of
commissioners designates areas or sites. Persons or organizations may "recommend"
structures or areas for "consideration"); Louisvwu., supra note 76, § 4 (commission
designates after a public hearing; no procedure for initiation of the process by an
individual).
" COVINGTON, supra note 76, § 40.07 (permanent denial, but owner may modify
application and resubmit); LouiSviLLE, supra note 76, §§ 8(e)-(f) (six month stay
period).
,1 See COVINGTON, supra note 76, § 40.10. However, if the owner can show that
property is "encapable [sic] of earning an economic return upon its value," the
commission must recommend to the owner a "satisfactory plan for its preservation."
Id.
' See COVINGTON, supra note 76, § 40.11; LouIsvILLE, supra note 76, §§ 10, 12.
" While each state possesses the sovereign power of eminent domain within its
jurisdiction, Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1844), a municipality
has no such inherent Dower. A city must therefore derive its power from state enabling
statutes. The enabling statutes in Kentucky are KRS §§ 94.680, 85.120(4), 86.110(8),
87.090, 88.100 (Supp. 1978).
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may present a financial problem to a city in two ways: the
required compensation is often substantial, and the purchase
removes the property as a revenue-generating tax source. As an
alternative to permanent acquisition in fee, the property could
be acquired and resold to persons who desire to preserve the
unique character of the structure. Preservation of the property
could be assured by including restrictive covenants prohibiting
incompatible use or alteration in the deed. 5 An additional al-
ternative would be the purchase or condemnation of a less than
fee interest in the form of a protective easement. While Ken-
tucky statutes prohibit local legislative bodies from exercising
the power of eminent domain to acquire a scenic or open space
easement," there apparently is no prohibition from using the
power to obtain a facade easement.
To the extent a less than fee interest is acquired, the re-
duction in the property's value could manifest itself in a lower
property tax assessment. A substantial tax reduction could
induce owners of historic property who wish to maintain the
existing use to donate a protective easement.9
95 A city's comprehensive plan for historic preservation often includes the estab-
lishment of a revolving fund to- accomplish this technique. Funded only once, the
depletion of the fund from purchase of historic property is offset by returning the sales
proceeds to the fund, thus making money available for a subsequent purchase.
" KRS § 65.460 (Supp. 1978). For a definition of a scenic easement, see id. §
65.410(4). If property covered by a scenic easement agreement is obtained by the
exercise of eminent domain, the scenic easement will terminate. Id. § 65.460.
,7 A facade easement is distinguishable from a scenic easement in that the latter
restricts development which will destroy the "open space character" of property, KRS
§ 65.410(4), while the former prohibits the owner from altering the exterior portions of
or demolishing a structure without the permission of the holder of the easement.
18 However, this result is not always true, especially where scenic easements are
involved. See Comment, Techniques for Preserving Open Spaces, 75 HAv. L. REV.
1622 (1962).
Kentucky statutes specifically state that where a scenic easement has been do-
nated or has been purchased by a municipality, the property tax assessment shall be
lowered to reflect the decrease in value. KRS § 65.450 (Supp. 1978).
For examples of other states providing for reduced assessments for historic prop-
erty, see Shull, The Use of Tax Incentives for Historic Preservation, 8 CONN. L. REv.
334, 344-46 (1976).
" Recipients of such donations could be private organizations interested in his-
toric preservation or governmental agencies. For example, in Lexington, the
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Historic Commission is authorized to receive dona-
tions of property interests, LEMNGTON, Ky., CODE § 2-89(h), and private Lexington
groups such as the Bluegrass Trust actively seek and encourage such donations.
On the state level both the Kentucky Historical Society and Kentucky Heritage
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Additional property tax incentive6 may be provided by
local government.'00 For example, a city may create an exemp-
tion for historic property, allow credits for rehabilitation ex-
penditures, or grant abatements upon a showing that the con-
tinuing existence of a structure is threatened because of the
high tax burden imposed, or that the structure can no longer
earn a reasonable rate of return.'0 ' A municipality may also
make available financial assistance for those persons interested
in acquiring an historic structure. This is likely to be in the
form of mortgage money, insurance, or low interest loans.
C. Constitutional Limitations
To the extent that historic preservation laws restrict the
right of an individual to do what he desires with his property,
they must conform to certain constitutional requirements. The
restrictions imposed by such laws are most often challenged on
the basis that they constitute a "taking" of property without
just compensation in violation of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments or that they arbitrarily deprive a person of his
property without due process of law in violation of the four-
Commission are authorized to receive private donations of real or personal property.
KRS §§ 171.311 art. I, .381(5)(d) (Supp. 1978).
The gift of a property interest may also qualify the donor for income, estate, and
gift tax charitable contribution deductions. See notes 38-43 infra and accompanying
text.
'. In addition to local legislative efforts, private interest groups, usually non-
profit organizations, may play a critical role in a community's preservation plan. For
example, in Lexington, the Bluegrass Trust for Historic Preservation has participated
in the promotion and selection of a professional planning staff for the Lexington-
Fayette County Planning Commission and the establishment of the Board of Architec-
tural Review and the Lexington Fayette County Historic Commission. It has provided
necessary research and study for the promotion and designation of historic districts in
the city and for the design of sites or areas to be listed on the National Register. It
has established an historic structure identification program, placing markers on histor-
ically significant property. In addition to purchasing, restoring, and maintaining prop-
erty, the Trust has purchased deed restrictions and assisted in paying for restoration
of public structures. The Trust has also established a revolving fund for one of the
city's historic districts, which is used to purchase threatened structures, restore their
exteriors and resell the property for residential or commercial use subject to protective
deed restrictions. The dissemination of public information about restoration and the
promotion of public interest in historic preservation has also been a function of the
Trust.
0I For a more detailed discussion of property tax incentives see Schull, supra note
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teenth amendment.1 2 Most challenges are directed toward
state and local legislation, since federal laws do not regulate
directly the use of privately owned historic property.
0 3
Since the enactment of historic district ordinances is a
relatively new concept in Kentucky, the Kentucky Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals have not had occasion to comment
on the constitutionality of such laws."0 4 However, courts in
other jurisdictions indicate that land use restrictions are sub-
ject to selected arbitrariness and taking challenges.' 5
"I "No person shall be . .. deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compen-
sation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See also
Ky. CONST. arts. 13, 242.
NI Federal law focuses on the National Register for Historic Places. The primary
legal consequences stemming from property being listed or eligible for listing on the
Register is that the appropriate federal agency must consider the impact of its
federally-funded projects on listed or eligible property, see notes 22-36 supra and
accompanying text; the property may potentially qualify for matching grant-in-aid
restoration funds, see notes 37-75 supra and accompanying text; and certain tax conse-
quences may attach to the property, see notes 123-149 infra and accompanying text.
While these legal consequences may indirectly affect the use of listed or eligible prop-
erty, they do not prohibit any use of the property and therefore do not constitute a
"taking" of the property. The owner may use the property as he desires even to the
extent of altering or demolishing a significant structure. The Tax Reform Act of 1976
took away certain income tax advantages accruing to owners who demolished struc-
tures and replaced them with new construction. But the Supreme Court has held that
no individual has a vested right in the provisions of any tax statute in the sense that
loss of previously available deductions or other benefits could be considered a "taking"
of property. United States Trust Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 311 U.S. 678
(1940). See 78 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 305 (1978); Letter from James D. Webb, Associate
Solicitor, Department of the Interior, to Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General, Com-
monwealth of Kentucky (Mar. 3, 1978).
104 The only Kentucky court to express an opinion on the constitutionality of
historic preservation ordinances was the Jefferson Circuit Court in City of Louisville
v. Women's Club, No. 197724 (Jefferson Cir. Ct. Jan. 17, 1976), rev'd per curiam (on
other grounds), No. 76-298 (Ky. Sup. Ct. Dec. 17, 1976). The lower court held the
Louisville ordinance unconstitutional. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the
constitutionality of the ordinance was not at issue in the case. For a criticism of the
circuit court's opinion, see Comment, A Challenge to Historic Preservation in
Kentucky, 65 KY. L.J. 895 (1977).
'" The power of a municipal body to promulgate land use restrictions is a deriva-
tive of the general police power inherent in every state to regulate matters relating to
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. See Comment, Legal Methods of
Historic Preservation, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 611, 616 (1970). To satisfy due process, a
zoning ordinance must be enacted in pursuit of a legitimate public purpose. See e.g.,
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), Paris Adult Theatre v. Slater, 413
HISTORIC PRESERVATION
While an historic district ordinance need not be rigidly
drawn so as to preclude reasonable administrative discretion, ,06
the ordinance cannot delegate unfettered authority to architec-
tural review boards and survive a due process challenge. To the
extent the ordinances provide inadequate decision-making cri-
teria for the designation of areas or sites or for the issuance of
a permit for alteration or demolition, the ordinance may be
held unconstitutional. 10 However, factors such as specific des-
ignation of areas to which the board's authority runs, requiring
persons appointed to the board to have expertise in the area of
historic preservation, the availability of surveys and other his-
toric data to guide decisions, and the availability of judicial or
administrative review have been sufficient to prevent a finding
of arbitrary and discriminatory action even where there existed
no specific guidelines to regulate the board's decisions.' 8
U.S. 49 (1973); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Legislative
bodies are entrusted with the task of defining public purpose, Maher v. City of New
Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1059 (5th Cir. 1975), and where their determination is "fairly
debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control." Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co. 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). Normally, historic district and landmark
preservation ordinances, including those in Kentucky, state that preservation and
protection of areas and structures of historic or architectural significance are within
the public interest, see, e.g., Louisville, Ky. Ordinance 58 series 1973, § 1(b) (1973).
Despite the presumption of validity, such declarations have been challenged in the
courts. Land use regulations designed to enhance the quality of life by preserving the
character and desirable aesthetic features of a city have been recognized to be in
furtherance of a legitimate public interest, see, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427
U.S. 297 (1976); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974); Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). For a discussion of aesthetic zoning, see Schroder, The
Preservation of Historical Areas, 62 Ky. L.J. 940 (1974); Comment, Use of Zoning
Restrictions to Restrain Property Owners from Altering or Destroying Historic
Landmarks, 1975 DuKE L.J. 999. Aesthetic considerations may also be coupled with
an economic interest to promote tourism. See, e.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516
F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975); New Orleans v. Levy, 64 So.2d 798 (La. 1953). The "public
interest" question with respect to zoning may no longer be an issue, see Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978), where the petitioner conceded
legitimacy.
I" Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1062 (5th Cir. 1975); City of
Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 389 P.2d 13, 18 (N.M. 1964).
" See generally Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975).
,u Id. at 1061-63. See generally New Orleans v. Levy, 64 So.2d 798 (La. 1953); City
of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 389 P.2d 13 (N.M. 1964). See also Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (1978). But see City of Louisville v.
Women's Club, No. 197724 (Jefferson Cir. Ct. Jan. 17, 1976), rev'd per curiam (on other
grounds), No. 76-298 (Ky. Sup. Ct. Dec. 17, 1976).
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A challenge of discriminatory or "reverse spot"'1' zoning
may still be made against landmark ordinances. Historic dis-
trict ordinances have survived such challenges on the basis that
they are designed not only to preserve individual structures but
also the unique character of an entire area by imposing restric-
tions which are uniform and binding upon all persons similarly
situated. ' Landmark ordinances, however, single out individ-
ual structures to be regulated. As a result, the benefits accruing
to structures within an historic district are not present. This
distinction, however, has not been sufficient to sustain chal-
lenges to landmark ordinances on the ground that they are
"discriminatory" if they have been enacted pursuant to a com-
prehensive plan to preserve structures of historic or aesthetic
interest throughout a jurisdiction."'
The taking issue has emerged as the primary challenge to
the application of historic district and landmark legislation.
The issue is basically one of fairness: "[The] [f]ifth amend-
ment's guarantee [is] designed to bar government from forc-
ing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole." 112 The question of when "fairness and justice" require
compensation for economic injuries suffered by a property
owner depends primarily upon the particular circumstances
surrounding the alleged taking. 13 Despite the ad hoc nature of
such factual inquiries, it is clear from the 1978 Supreme Court
opinion in Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of
New York"' that certain considerations permeate the analysis
of taking challenges to historic preservation ordinances. '
0I The term "reverse spot" zoning is frequently used to refer to land use legislation
which arbitrarily singles out a particular parcel of land, imposing upon it restrictions
not applicable to surrounding parcels.
,, E.g., City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 5 So.2d 129 (La. 1941).
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2663 (1978).
"1 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
" United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958).
', 98 S.Ct. 2646 (1978).
" The issue of whether a land use restriction rises to the point of a "taking"
within the meaning of the fifth and fourteenth amendments has been an issue of
considerable difficulty for the courts. Courts and commentators alike have espoused
various theories as to when a governmental action results in a compensable taking.
Various judicial attempts include the "physical invasion test" (a taking results when
the government occupies, appropriates, or systematically intrudes on the affected
[Vol. 671042
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Of primary concern is the severity of the economic impact
on the owner of affected property. The application of an ordi-
nance cannot be unduly harsh so as to deny a reasonable use
or to interfere severely with distinct investment-backed expec-
tations."1 To the extent this test requires an examination of
diminution in the property's value or rate of return, certain
questions remain unsettled. Such questions include: To what
extent is a property's value attributable to societal efforts?" 7
What are the specific elements of return? 8
property), see, e.g., Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 417 (1823); Coates v. City
of New York, 7 Cow. 584 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827); The "noxious use test" (a government
can impose land use restrictions to prohibit a use which is injurious to health, morals,
or safety of the community regardless of the impact upon the affected property owner),
see, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Hadacheck v. Sebas-
tian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); the "diminution in
value test" (a taking results where the economic impact on the affected property is
too great), see, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The most
notable attempts by legal scholars have been by Professor Joseph Sax: Sax, Takings
and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Sax, Takings, Private Property and
Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971) and by Professor Frank Michelman: Michel-
man, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HAv. L. REV. 1165 (1967). For a discussion of the above
theories, see Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARv. L. Rev. 1427,1462-86 (1978).
Despite these efforts, the law remains unsettled. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City
of New York, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (1978) was the first attempt by the Supreme Court to
address the taking issue in the context of historic preservation. To the extent the
Court's opinion will mold future judicial challenges, the brief textual discussion will
be limited to factors considered important by the Court.
"1 98 S.Ct. at 2659. In Penn Central, New York City's Landmark Preservation Act
had been applied to deny the construction of a multi-story office complex on top of
Grand Central Station. The Court noted that the ordinance did not interfere-with the
current use of the terminal, the use to which the property was most suited; that all
use of the "air rights" above the terminal had not been denied; and that the law
allowed a reasonable return on the owners' investment by providing for property tax
relief should the owner show incapability of earning such a return. The Court therefore
concluded that a taking had not been established. See also Maher v. City of New
Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975) (petitioner required to show denial of reasonable
return, not merely that maximum economic potential impaired).
"I It has been suggested by at least one court that an historic structure's (or any
property's) value is in part attributable to the efforts of society and therefore the law
need not guarantee a reasonable return on that portion of the property's total value.
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 1977), aff'd 98
S.Ct. 2646 (1978). For a discussion of this idea, see Comment, New York's Changing
Conceptions of Land Use Law: Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,
27 BUFFALO L. Rav. 157, 166-69 (1978). The Supreme Court in deciding Penn Central
did not address this issue. 98 S.Ct. at 2658 n.23.
"' For example, should return be computed by using current earnings, which
could reflect management's inadequacies, or should it be computed on the property's
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Of secondary importance is the nature of the government
action involved. An ordinance cannot be applied so that it
amounts to an acquisition of resources for public use without
requiring just compensation to the owner of the property."9 A
similar question regarding public use arises with respect to the
exercise of eminent domain. However, the public use concept
raises a threshold issue in the context of eminent domain: a
governmental body may exercise eminent domain only if it is
taking property for public use. 120 Generally, courts have defined
"public use" broadly. For example, the Kentucky Court has
upheld the exercise of eminent domain where the historic struc-
ture was to be privately managed so long as the government
maintained ownership of the property and the Court has also
upheld eminent domain where the property might potentially
be resold to a private citizen interested in preserving the prop-
erty's historic integrity.1 2' In other states the public use concept
has also been broad enough to validate the taking of a scenic
or facade easement which leaves the affected property in pri-
vate hands.'2
2
capacity to earn a reasonable return? Should income from surrounding structures,
owned by the same person, be imputed to the affected structure? See Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 1977), aff'd 98 S.Ct. 2646
(1978); Comment, supra note 117.
"I Even though a taking may be established, there remains the problem of de-
termining "just compensation." Some ordinances attempt to mitigate the economic
burden by providing forms of property tax relief or by making available "transfer
development rights." See, e.g., NEW YORK Crr, N.Y., ZONING REs. §§ 74-79, 74-791 to
-793 (1975), which allows unused development rights to be transferred to contiguous
parcels in the same general area, thus allowing construction of those parcels to exceed
the maximum height and area requirements in the zone area. Because few challenges
to historic preservation ordinances have survived, there is little indication of the valid-
ity of these forms as just compensation. For a discussion of these problems and the
problem of determining the amount of compensation required, see Comment, supra
note 117.
,I" The public use concept is embodied in the fifth amendment; for the actual
language of the fifth amendment, see note 102 supra. See also Ky. Const. arts. 13, 242.
As with the enactment of historic district or landmark ordinances, see note 105
supra, the exercise of the power of eminent domain for the protection of historic sites
has been held to be in pursuit of a legitimate public purpose. United States v. Gettys-
burg Electric Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896); Roe v. Kansas, 278 U.S. 191 (1926).
"I Coke v. Commonwealth, 502 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1973) (involving the state's exer-
cise of eminent domain in acquiring the Mary Todd Lincoln house in Lexington); City
of Louisville v. Women's Club, No. 197724 (Jefferson Cir. Ct. Mar. 31, 1977), rev'd per
curiam (on other grounds), No. 76-298 (Ky. Sup. Ct. Dec. 17, 1976).
'2 See, e.g., State v. Houghton, 176 N.W. 159 (Minn. 1920). Kentucky municipali-
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IV. TAX INCENTIVES TO HISTORIC PRESERVATION
An indirect means by which federal and state governments
can promote the preservation of historic sites and areas is by
providing income and estate tax incentives to owners who
maintain such property. While tax provisions will not prohibit
destruction or alteration of historic property, an individual or
commercial business owner faced with the decision of what to
do with such property should consider the alternatives in light
of the possibly substantial tax consequences.
A. Federal Law
Prior to 1976, both federal and Kentucky1 23 tax law were
structured in such a way as to provide disincentives for historic
preservation. However, in recognition of the national interest
in restoration and preservation of historic structures and areas,
Congress included in the Tax Reform Act of 1976124 certain
provisions designed to discourage destruction of such property
and to stimulate private preservation efforts. 25
The primary disincentives to historic preservation had
been in regard to the deduction of demolition costs and the
favorable depreciation treatment on subsequently constructed
improvements. For example, assume an owner of a somewhat
deteriorated, depreciable historic structure was faced with the
ties -are prohibited from exercising the power of eminent domain to acquire scenic
easements. See note 96 supra and accompanying text.
,I For a discussion of Kentucky tax law, see notes 148-49 infra and accompanying
text.
tx, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (codified in various sections of the
Internal Revenue Code [hereinafter cited as I.R.C.]). The Revenue Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978), contained numerous technical corrections to the
Tax Reform Act in areas discussed herein. Subsequent citations to the Internal Reve-
nue Code, unless otherwise designated, will be to sections as amended by the Revenue
Act. For a discussion of the legislative history behind the passage of the Tax Reform
Act and certain problems in the original statutory language giving rise to the need for
the technical corrections, see Comment, Historic Preservation and the Tax Reform Act
of 1976, 11 U.S.F.L. REv. 453 (1977).
11 It is impossible within the broad scope of this note to give an exhaustive treat-
ment of the impact of the Tax Reform Act on historic preservation. For an excellent
treatment of the subject, see Comment, supra note 124. See also Covington & Burling,
Re: Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 on the Preservation of Historical Properties
(Jan. 27, 1977) (written for the National Trust for Historic Preservation); Note, State
and Federal Tax Incentives for Historic Preservation, 46 U. CiN. L. REv. 833 (1977).
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decision either to demolish the structure and erect a new build-
ing in its place or to maintain the old structure and incur
substantial rehabilitation expenditures. If the choice was to
demolish, the demolition costs as well as the remaining unde-
preciated basis in the structure were deductible in the year of
demolition as an ordinary loss."'6 The new building then con-
structed qualified for accelerated depreciation.127 However, if
the choice was to maintain the old structure, the rehabilitation
costs were required to be added to the taxpayer's basis,' 28 the
increased basis then being subject only to straight line depre-
ciation if the use of the property had not originated with the
taxpayer' 29-as would be the case with most historic property.
Therefore, the tax treatment clearly favored demolition.
Aware of the seriousness of this threat to the continued
preservation of historic structures, Congress, in the Tax Reform
Act, essentially reversed the tax treatment in favor of preserva-
tion. Now, if a structure is a "certified historic structure" as
defined in Code Section 191(d)(1), 30 the cost of its demolition
22M Demolition costs and the undepreciated basis of the property are deductible
under I.R.C. § 165(a),(c) as a loss incurred in trade or business or in a transaction
entered into for profit if the plan to demolish was formulated subsequent to the acquisi-
tion. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3 (1961). If the structure is purchased with the intent to
demolish it, the entire purchase price as well as the subsequent demolition costs are
allocated to the basis of the land. Id.
"2 I.R.C. § 167(c)(2). Normally, a taxpayer will elect to use an accelerated method
over the straight line method since the former allows for larger deductions during the
earlier years of the property's useful life.
'- I.R.C. §§ 263, 1016. The expenses are capital in nature.
I2 I.R.C. § 167(c)(2). An exception is provided for used residential rental property
which qualifies for 125% declining balance. I.R.C. § 167(j)(5).
'IQ In order to qualify as a "certified historic structure" the property must be
subject to depreciation and either be (1) listed in the National Register, or (2) located
in a registered historic district and certified by the Secretary of the Interior as being
of historic significance to the district. A registered historic district is a district which
is either listed on the National Register or designated under a state or local statute
which is certified by the Secretary of the Interior as containing criteria which substan-
tially achieve the purpose of preserving and rehabilitating buildings of historic signifi-
cance to the district. The state or locally designated district must in addition be
certified by the Secretary as meeting substantially all of the requirements for the
listing of districts in the National Register. I.R.C. §§ 191(d)(1)-(2). It should be noted
that this definition does not include individual buildings designated as "landmark
sites" under local ordinances unless such property is listed in the National Register.
An individual property owner cannot qualify a district as a registered historic
district by obtaining a certification of state or local statutes. Only the duly authorized
representative of the government which enacted that statute may request certification
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and the remaining undepreciated basis are disallowed as an
ordinary loss deduction.'3 ' Instead, these amounts are added to
the basis of the land.'3 2 Not only is the immediate offset to
ordinary income lost, but, since land is a nondepreciable capi-
tal asset,' the increase in basis cannot be depreciated and,
upon sale of the land, the cost would offset capital gains (or
increase capital losses) rather than ordinary income.' 34 In addi-
tion, the Code now disallows the use of accelerated deprecia-
tion methods for real property constructed in whole or in part
on a site which had been occupied, on or after June 30, 1976,
by a "certified historic structure" that was demolished or sub-
stantially altered other than by virtue of "certified rehabilita-
tion."' 35 In contrast, qualifying restoration or rehabilitation
expenditures now receive the favored treatment; the taxpayer
may elect either to amortize such expenditures over a sixty
month period'38 or add the costs to his basis in the property and
by the Secretary of Interior. For the requisite procedures and standards for obtaining
certification of statutes, see Department of Interior Regulations, 42 Fed. Reg. 40436
(1978) (to be codified in 36 C.F.R. § 67.9). However, once an historic district is so
designated, the burden of obtaining the certification of historic significance for an
individual structure is placed on the record owner of the property. The owner must
follow the regulations issued by the National Park Service in applying for such designa-
tion by the Secretary of the Interior. See 36 C.F.R. § 67.1-.8 (1977).
1 I.R.C. § 280B. The application of this section cannot be avoided by the owner's
failing to request certification since a presumption of historic significance is created
under the section absent certification of nonsignificance by the Secretary of the Inte-
rior. Id. § 280B(b).
The section applies only to the demolition of certified historic structures occurring
between June 30, 1976, and January 1, 1981. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
455, § 2124(b), 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
M I.R.C. § 280B(a)(2).
lu While land is a capital asset, it is not subject to depreciation because its useful
life is not amenable to estimation.
' With respect to gains, the offset to ordinary income is more desirable since
capital gains are taxed at a lower rate. See I.R.C. § 1202.
lu I.R.C. § 167(n)(1). Like Section 280B, the rule applies automatically to all
structures within a registered historic district unless the Secretary of the Interior issues
a certificate of nonsignificance. Id. For a discussion of certified rehabilitation, see notes
136-37 infra.
13 I.R.C. § 191. Code Section 191 allows expenditures for "certified rehabilitation"
incurred between June 14, 1976, and June 15, 1981, to be amortized over a sixty-month
period. The term "certified rehabilitation" means the certified historic structure has
been improved in a way which the Secretary of the Interior has certified "as being
consistent with the historic character of such property or the district in which the
property is located." Id. § 191(d)(3). For the applicable certification procedures and
evaluative standards utilized by the Secretary, see 36 C.F.R. §§ 67.6-.7 (1977). The
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use an accelerated method of depreciation in relation to his
entire basis.13
An additional incentive to historic preservation added by
Congress through the Tax Reform Act was the expansion of the
charitable contribution deduction to encompass gifts of certain
partial interests in property. Prior to the enactment of the Tax
Reform Act, only a gift of a remainder interest in a personal
residence or farm or an undivided portion of the taxpayer's
entire interest in property gave rise to a charitable deduction
absent satisfaction of rather complex rules dealing with inter-
ests transferable in trust.'8 Section 170(f) now allows charita-
qualifying rehabilitation expenses form what is termed an "amortizable basis." This
part of the property's total basis can, at the election of the taxpayer, be amortized over
the sixty-month period beginning with either the next month after the expenses are
incurred or the first month of the succeeding taxable year. I.R.C. § 191(a), (d)(z). For
the requisite procedures in making the election, see Temporary Treas. Reg. § 7.191-
1(a). The amount of the deduction is determined by a formula which results in an equal
write-off of the amortizable basis during each of the sixty months. I.R.C. § 191(a). The
remaining portion of the property's total basis is unaffected by the election and there-
fore is still subject to depreciation during the time the rehabilitation expenditures are
being amortized. Id.
The amortization election under § 191 is available to owners, life tenants, and
certain lessees of historic structures who incur the rehabilitation expeditures. Id. § 191
(a),(f). In order for a lessee to qualify, the remaining term of his lease (without regard
to any renewal period) must, at the time the certified rehabilitation is completed, have
a remaining term equal to or in excess of the useful life or the improvements but in no
event less than thirty years. Id. § 191(f).
"I' I.R.C. § 167(o). As an alternative to the amortization election, a taxpayer
incurring expenses for certified rehabilitation may elect under § 167(a) to utilize, with
respect to "substantially rehabilitated property," accelerated depreciation in lieu of
the straight line depreciation otherwise allowable. "Substantially rehabilitated his-
toric property" means any certified historic structures with respect to which capital-
ized expenditures for certified rehabilitation during the twenty-four month period
ending on the last day of any taxable year, reduced by the amortization or depreciation
taken with respect thereto, exceeds the greater of (a) the adjusted basis of the property
as of the beginning of the twenty-four month period or (b) $5000. Id. § 167(o)(2). The
electing taxpayer is treated under the section as the original user of the property and
therefore the property's entire basis qualifies for the 150% (or 200% for residential
rental property) declining balance method of depreciation.
For an analysis of the taxpayers choice between §§ 191(a) and 167(o), see Com-
ment, supra note 124, at 475-77.
lu I.R.C. § 170(f)(3) (amended 1976). The rules governing the contribution of
property placed in trust are contained in § 170(f)(2). A remainder interest is deductible
where transferred to a charitable remainder annuity trust, a charitable remainder
unitrust (I.R.C. § 664), or a pooled income fund (I.R.C. § 642(c)(5)). An income
interest is deductible if (1) the interest is in the form of a guaranteed annuity or if the
trust instrument specifies that the interest is a fixed percentage of the fair market
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ble deductions for donations made before June 14, 1981, of less
than the full interest in the taxpayer's individual or commer-
cial property where the contribution is in the form of a lease,
option to purchase, or easement with respect to real property
granted in perpetuity'3' to a charitable organization organized
exclusively for conservation purposes. 40 In addition, a charita-
ble deduction is allowed for the contribution of a remainder
interest in all real property (not just farms and residences)
granted to such an organization.141 The term "conservation pur-
poses" is defined to include the preservation of historically
important land areas or structures.'42 Therefore, gifts of a fa-
cade easement giving the donee the right to protect the outside
architectural features of a structure may now qualify for a char-
itable deduction. Similarly, scenic or open space easements
designed to restrict future development on the site might give
rise to a charitable deduction.'43
value of the trust property, and (2) the income from trust property is taxable to the
grantor under I.R.C. §§ 671-679.
"I3 After the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the Code allowed a charitable
deduction for a lease, an option to purchase, or an easement with respect to real
property of not less than 30 years. However, Congress amended the Code to its present
state which requires that such interests contributed after June 14, 1977, be in perpetu-
ity. Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, 91 Stat. 126
(1977).
,4, I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii). The amount of the charitable dbduction is the fair
market value of the partial or remainder interest given. Id. § 170(a); Treas. Reg.
1.170A(c) (1975). Special valuation problems arise in relation to gifts of easements and
remainder interests since there is a lack of comparable market prices. For valuation
rules applicable to scenic (and presumably facade) easements, see Rev. Rul. 73-339,
1973-2 C.B. 68 (clarified by Rev. Rul. 76-376, 1976-2 C.B. 53). See also Thayer, 36
T.C.M. (CCH) 1504 (1977); Browne, Jr. and Van Dorn, Charitable Gifts of Partial
Interest in Real Property for Conservation Purposes, 29 TAx LAw. 69 (1975). For the
rules applicable to remainder interests, see Trees. Reg. § 1.170A-12(b)(3) (1975).
"' I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(B)(iv).
4" Id. § 170(f)(3)(C). The definition also includes the preservation of land areas
for public outdoor recreation or education or scenic enjoyment and the protection of
natural environment systems. Id.
10 A facade easement normally prohibits the owner of a building from altering or
modifying the exterior of the structure without consent of the holder. It may also
impose a duty of maintenance, allow the holder to inspect periodically, and grant the
right to sue for an injunction upon violation of the terms of the easement.
A scenic, open space, or developmental rights easement restricts the owner of the
burdened property from certain development either as to land not containing struc-
tures or unused air space above an existing structure. In order to satisfy the perpetuity
requirement of § 171(f)(3)(B)(iii), the easement must contain a provision that it will
be binding upon all future owners of the property. If recorded properly, the easement
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A final incentive to historic preservation contained in the
Tax Reform Act arises indirectly through the enactment of
Code Section 2032A, which deals with the estate tax valuation
of real property used in connection with a farming operation or
a closely held business. Prior to the enactment of the section,
all historically significant property was valued for estate tax
purposes at its highest or best use value, i.e., its value for
commercial development.'44 As a result of a valuation exceed-
ing the property's present use value, heirs were often forced to
sell such property in order to pay the estate tax. Through appli-
cation of Section 2032A, if certain conditions are met,"5 the
executor of an estate containing an historically significant farm
or an historic structure used in a closely held business may
elect'46 to value the historic property on the basis of the prop-
erty's current rather than best use value. 47 While historic sig-
"runs with the land" and does not terminate upon sale or transfer of the property. See
Comment, supra note 124 at 484-85 n.130.
For a discussion of tax planning techniques emcompassing scenic and facade
easements, see A. ARNOLD, TAX SHELTER IN REAL ESTATE UNDER THE TAX REFORN ACr
OF 1976 43-45 (1977); Comment, supra note 124, at 484-85.
'" "Under present law, the value of the property included in the gross estate of
the decedent is its fair market value at the date of the decedent's death (or at the
alternate valuation date). One of the most important factors in determining fair mar-
ket value is the 'highest and best use' to which the property can be put." H.R. REP.
No. 1515, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., app. A, at 609 (1976).
"I In order to qualify, the real property must be located in the United States and
on the date of the decedent's death it must be used either for farming purposes or in a
trade or business. The property must have been used in this manner for five out of the
eight years preceeding the decedent's death and during that period the decedent or a
member of the decedent's family must have owned the property and materially partici-
pated in the operation of the farm or other business. For an in depth discussion of the
material participation requirement, see Note, Material Participation and the Valua-
tion of Farm Land for Estate Tax Purposes Under the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 66 KY.
L.J. 848 (1978). The property must pass to a member of.the decedent's family (i.e.,
an ancestor or lineal descendant, a lineal descendant of a grandparent, the decedent's
spouse, or the spouse of any such decedent). In addition, the adjusted value of the real
or personal property used in the farming or business operation must comprise at least
fifty percent, and the qualifying real property must exceed twenty-five percent, of the
adjusted value of the decedent's estate. The term "adjusted value" means the value
of property for estate tax purposes (determined without regard to § 2032A) reduced
by any indebtedness attributable to such property. I.R.C. § 2032A.
" The procedural dimensions of making an election are governed by I.R.C. §
2032A(d).
,17 I.R.C. § 2032A(a)(1). The Code specifically provides a method for valuing
qualified real property used for farming purposes. The value is based on an average
capitalization of comparable rental values. See id. § 2032A(e) (7); proposed Treas. Reg.
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nificance is not a prerequisite to the application of the section,
this provision nevertheless provides some relief from the valua-
tion pressures placed on certain historic property that other-
wise meets its requirements.
B. Kentucky Law
While the Kentucky legislature has not directly provided
for income tax incentives for historic preservation, the state's
tax law is structured so that all deductions allowable to indi-
viduals or businesses under chapter one of the Internal Reve-
nue Code are permissible deductions in deriving state taxable
net income.' Therefore, the preservation income tax incen-
tives included in the Tax Reform Act of 1976 are incorporated
into Kentucky law.
In contrast, the inheritance and estate tax laws of the state
do not parallel those on the federal level. However, the 1978
legislative session passed an act creating, with respect to farm-
land, an inheritance tax valuation provision similar to Internal
Revenue Code Section 2032A.'4
§ 20.2032A-4, 43 Fed. Reg. 31039 (1978). For qualified real property used in a closely
held business (or for farming purposes where there are no comparable rental values or
the executor elects not to use the capitalization formula), the value is determined by
examination of all relevant factors including capitalization of income and fair rental
values, differential or use value land assessments, and comparable sales of other farms
or closely held businesses. I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(8).
The Code limits the resulting decrease in property valuation from the application
of the special use formula to $500,000. Id. § 2032A(a)(2). In addition, a recapture
provision is set forth requiring recapture in whole or in part of the tax benefit resulting
from the special valuation if, within fifteen years after the decedent's death, a qualified
heir disposes of any interest in the property to one other than a member of his family
or ceases to use the acquired property for a "qualified use". See I.R.C. § 2032A(c)(1),
(7).
" KRS § 141.010(11), (13) (Supp. 1978). Exceptions exist, but they are inapplica-
ble for purposes of this discussion.
"' 1978 Ky. Acts, ch. 138, §§ 5-12. The new statutes provide that, at the election
of the person responsible for filing the return, real property includable in the gross
estate of a decedent dying between July 1, 1978, and June 30, 1979, which is either
agricultural or horticultural land and has been used for agricultural or horticultural
purposes for five years prior to the death of the owner may be valued for ihheritance
tax purposes at its agricultural or horticultural use value if the value of the land
exceeds fifty percent of the gross taxable estate. The real property must, however, pass
to a "qualified person," i.d., a surviving spouse, who proposes to devote the property
to agricultural or horticultural purposes for at least five years after the death of the
decedent. The reduction in the gross estate cannot exceed $500,000, and the tax benefit
1978-79] 1051
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CONCLUSION
It is hoped that by the dissemination of the information
contained in this work all persons interested in preserving a
significant and important aspect of our environment and so-
ciety will be encouraged to participate, or continue their partic-
ipation with renewed fervor, in historic preservation efforts. It
has been pointed out that tools have been provided by all levels
of government with which to preserve our historic environment.
These tools increasingly affect the private citizen. Under the
NHPA, federal agencies and private citizens can take action to
prevent destruction of historic property by federal projects.
Grants are available to owners of such property for rehabilita-
tion purposes under both the NHPA and the Kentucky Historic
Preservation Program. Interested owners of culturally valuable
property in several Kentucky cities can seek the establishment
of an historic district under local zoning ordinances. Finally,
federal and Kentucky tax law now offer incentives for owners
of historically significant property to maintain the property in
its present valuable state or to rehabilitate property in a cur-
rently deteriorated condition.
Like the protection of the air, water, and other natural
resources, preservation of our historic environment is a con-
tinuing responsibility of all citizens. Just as we cannot be satis-
fied with air that is merely "acceptable," or water that is mar-
ginally drinkable, we cannot be satisfied with preserving only
is recaptured if the qualified property is sold, conveyed, or otherwise transferred, or if
the existing use is changed. The recapture is secured by a five year lien on the property.
KRS §§ 140.300-.360 (Supp. 1978).
In comparing the availability of the Kentucky special use valuation provisions
with the federal provision in I.R.C. § 2032A, it should be noted that the Kentucky
statutes do not require material participation by a decedent or a member of the family,
and in addition limit the post death transfer or change in use to five rather than fifteen
years. Therefore, an historical farm which has been passively rented prior to the death
of the owner may qualify for special valuation for Kentucky inheritance tax purposes
but not for federal estate tax purposes. The absence of a material participation require-
ment on the beneficiary coupled with a relatively small time limitation on transfer or
change of use makes the Kentucky provision more attractive. However, it should also
be noted that the Kentucky statutes more narrowly define to whom the qualifying real
property must pass, compare KRS §§ 140.300(5) with I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(1), and limit
the valuation to land and income producing improvements, excluding residences which
may qualify for a lower valuation under the federal provisions. Compare KRS §§
140.'300(1)-(2), 132.010(7)-(8) with I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(3).
1052 [Vol. 67
1978-79] HISTORIC PRESERVATION 1053
some of the historic resources that now exist. And, unlike the
air and the water which are capable of being revitalized and
restored, once an object of historic and cultural value is lost, it
is lost forever.
Mark MacDonald and Richard D. Simms
